From supply chains and export controls to trade corridors and market access, the section explores trade as an instrument of power as much as prosperity.
The Hormuz crisis represents an ideal test of the latest research into the geoeconomics of global trade – as well as a source of insights for decision-makers in the business and policy spheres.
States are willing to subjugate business interests under the pretext of national security. Yet when the neutrality of straits are compromised, businesses and consumers bear the costs.
Arctic infrastructure investment, increasingly critical to the global supply of rare earth elements and other critical minerals, is subject to an emerging set of “gates” – permission, capital, and geopolitical alignment. Each gate is equally mandatory, eternally unstable, and mutually interlocking.
Geoeconomic leverage is an indispensable aspect of global politics and security in the 21st century, and scholars and statesmen should adjust accordingly.
Steel firms in the EU and ASEAN are increasingly shaped by geoeconomic pressures. They must prioritise resilience and strategic positioning above traditional market advantages.
Global capital is entering a new phase in which financial returns are no longer the sole determinant of investment decisions. Mexico provides a revealing case of this transformation.
Strategic assets no longer transfer seamlessly between geopolitical blocs, yet transactions still occur. Firms that delay action in anticipation of improved conditions risk falling behind those that proactively develop resilient arrangements.
As great-power rivalry reaches into the plumbing of global trade, governments that spent decades selling their terminals to the most efficient bidder are now scrutinising, capping, and occasionally overturning foreign ownership of them on grounds of national security.
Ports are where the argument about chokepoints begins. Yet steel is not a port, and neither is a chipmaker, an app, or a tyre-maker. Each sector stands on the same ground: ownership is no longer the markets to settle alone.
As the architects of a company’s geographic footprint, executives must recognise the importance of geoeconomic fluency in navigating screening regimes.
Europe is efficient at starting deep-tech, quantum, and defence companies, but it struggles when these firms need to scale up. The reliance on US funds has become systemic.
Iran’s blockade of Hormuz revealed a subtler chokepoint than the strait itself: the compliance architecture – insurance, clearing, sanctions exposure – that decides who can afford to move. For governments and shipowners alike, permission has replaced possession as the currency of maritime power.
The dollar still dominates global finance, but its once-assumed neutrality is beginning to erode as geopolitics reshapes access to the world’s financial infrastructure. Rather than abandoning the dollar, states are building safeguards against overdependence.
Industrial policy has re-emerged as a central tool for policymakers and is increasingly justified in terms of national security. Beneath this securitised framing lies a more specific logic: state-led engineering of physical chokepoints.
Firms respond differently to geopolitical pressures: Chinese firms align with state priorities, US firms adapt to policy incentives, and Indonesian firms pursue upgrading.
Public debate on economic coercion still looks at ports and sanctions lists. The leverage sits several supply-chain tiers below, in opaque and irreplaceable suppliers.
While critical minerals are geographically dispersed, the capabilities required to process and refine them remain highly concentrated in a small number of industrial ecosystems.
The era of the “retreating state” is over. Firms are increasingly judged not only by market performance, but by their strategic alignment with national security priorities.
Critical minerals are now at the centre of the green transition, but their origin is often difficult to verify. Poor traceability creates opportunities for criminal groups to profit from the same supply chains.
In a world fracturing along digital borders, states are weaponising strict regulatory barriers and export controls to shield their sovereign data from foreign extraction.
Vietnam is pushing its rare earth sector up the value chain, seeking to capture more value from its reserves rather than export raw materials. But reliance on foreign capital could constrain national development goals.
China is preparing a commercial rollout of mBridge after a record RMB 11.3bn settlement in June 2026. Its shift from a limited CBDC experiment to commercial use could reshape cross-border payments.
Kazakhstan created the Astana International Financial Centre to let firms operate under common rules. EU sanctions are now testing whether the centre can remain insulated.
The West has pushed China’s cable champion out of allied projects, splitting the subsea cable industry into rival technology camps. But an ageing fleet of specialised ships determines how quickly damaged cables can be repaired.
Central banks seek less dependence on the dollar, but diversification has limits. The deeper challenge is gaining control over how reserves are priced, held, and settled.
Vessel behaviour, route choices, port calls, and supply-chain performance have all been affected by the crisis, with implications extending far beyond the immediate conflict zone.